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ABSTRACT
This paper develops an analysis of buyers' strategies. We analyze markets in which sellers have
significant customer or market- specific investments but that buyers can make credible, albeit costly
and time consuming commitments to obtain alternative sources of supply. Because of sellers' specific
assets, de novo entry would be naturally blockaded in a standard oligopoly model. We show, however,
that once buyers' strategies are considered in markets with these characteristics, the market power of
sellers is more attenuated than models with unsophisticated buyers would predict. In particular, current
prices and the decision to switch suppliers (including via vertical integration) are related, so that limit
pricing (against switching or vertical integration) is a likely form of equilibrium pricing, even in the
presence of full information. Limit prices are shown to increase with the amount of time it takes to
switch, and with the level of buyers' switching costs, but to faM with the level of sunk investments.
Thus, in such markets, although sunk costs can be a barrier to de novo entry, suck costs restrain,
rather than increase, the ability of sellers to exert market power. This paper, then, questions the
standard oligopoly model prediction of an inverse relationship between market performance and sunk
investments, and shows the relevance of buyers' strategies for predicting market performance.

I. Introduction
Modern oligopoly theory accords little latitude for factors other than impediments to
effective collusion among existing producers to discipline competition. For example, in
markets with significant scale economies and sunk costs, entry is likely to be blockaded by
low post entry prices, and in the absence of informational asymmetries, pre-entry prices are
unrelated to entry decisions by informed potential entrants. Protected from the threat of
entry, price competition only arises to the extent there are limitations on the ability of
incumbents to effect tacit or explicit collusion. Building on this result, the strategic
literature is abundant in models of incumbents making strategic commitments to
investments analogous to sunk costs in order to deter entry.
Another literature examining the relationship between sunk costs and competition is
transactions cost theory. 1 Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978), and Williamson (1979), for
example, examine the implications of the possibility that a seller's sunk costs may be
expropriated by his sophisticated customers if those customers can credibly threaten to
vertically integrate. In this literature sunk costs place the seller at risk to the threat of
"entry" by a sophisticated buyer, and the only resolution of this risk may be ex ante vertical
integration.
Modern oligopoly theory and transactions costs theory thus make quite different
predictions about the relationship of sunk costs and competition. In oligopoly theory sunk
costs allow oligopolies to exploit their customers without fear of the discipline of entry,
limited only by impediments to collusion. In transactions cost theory, on the other hand, the
direction of potential exploitation is reversed, with sunk investments leaving sellers at risk
of exploitation by their customers.
One important reason for these contradictory predictions is that in most oligopoly
1 Sec, Coase (1937) and (1987), and Williamson (1975), (1979), (1983) and (1985).
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models buyers are simply demand curves. Such modelling is generally unrealistic, since
most industries produce intermediate goods sold to other producers or distributors (like
supermarkets). Such customers are not only well aware of the consumer surplus derived
from their transactions, but are likely to be as able as their suppliers to engage in strategic
behavior.
U.S. automobile manufacturers, for example, have long used a number of strategies,
not limited to the threat of vertical integration, to discipline their suppliers (see Porter
(1983)). Supermarkets facing manufacturers with apparent market power engage in
sophisticated nonlinear pricing of their purchases (including lump sum fees for shelf space
called "slotting allowances"), various forms of all-or-none bargaining, and contract for the
manufacture of store brands that compete with major suppliers' products. Markets in which
the major customers can usefully be modelled as demand curves are largely limited to retail
off-the-shelf consumer products. A more accurate modelling of most markets in our
economy would have surplus-conscious buyers who may be able to engage in strategic
behavior.
This paper sets out a simple model in which suppliers are protected from de novo
entry by sunk investments, but buyers have the ability to make credible threats to switch
sources of supply. We assume that switching takes time and requires some up front
investment, so that incumbent suppliers have substantial short run market power. Our
model encompasses general strategies involving commitments to switch sources of supply,
with vertical integration being just one example. The switching we are considering here is
not what is normally thought of as input substitution, such as, say, a baker switching from
one grade of wheat flour with a given protein content to another in response to a change in
2 Most transactions in intermediate good industries arise from bargaining between sales
representatives and purchasing agents. In those cases, sales arc effected essentially by
bargaining between the sellers and buyers. For this reason alone, modelling buyers as
passive demand curves is generally inappropriate.
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the protein premium. Rather, we are interested in situations in which a buyer cannot
substitute for a particular input in the short run, but can substitute, in time, by making
suitable, specific investments. In such situations, suppliers of the input may have
substantial potential market power in the short run. This paper is concerned with the
impact of credible, but costly, time-consuming switching on the exercise of that short run
market power.
We show that seller sunk costs and the time required for buyers to switch to
alternative sources of supply are critical factors in the determination of supplier and buyer
power, and therefore, of the state of competition. In particular, contrary to the predictions
of standard oligopoly theory, our model predicts that sunk costs are inversely related to the
extent of exercised market power, but that the length of time required to switch is
positively related to the extent of exercised market power. Finally, our results have
important implications for the theoretical underpinnings and application of the 1982
Department of Justice Merger Guidelines.
The variety of switching strategies.
Input substitution that takes time and investment arises in a variety of forms. In
general, such substitution may involve switching to a different type of input, or switching
to an alternative supplier of a similar input, perhaps, via vertical integration or long term
contracting. Consider input switching first. Many manufacturers requiring containers for
their products regularly evaluate the desirability of using glass or rubber or plastic or steel
or aluminum, or different types or grades of glass, etc., based to some extent on the relative
costs of these inputs.3 For example, over time brewers have considered switching from
glass bottles to steel cans to aluminum cans; soft drink bottlers have considered switching
from glass to plastic bottles; manufacturers of household appliances have considered
' For the evolution of the threats of substitution of purchasers of metal cans, sec Bower
(nd), and Hammermesh, Gordon, and Reed (nd).
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switching from metal to plastic appliance housings; and supermarkets have considered
switching from paper to plastic bags. Other companies regularly evaluate the desirability
of using PC's or non-computer substitutes, or PC's or minicomputers (see Porter 1985, pp.
290-291), captive or contract transportation, etc. In cases such as these, switching takes time
and requires investment in both physical and human capital. Switching from glass to
plastic bottles, for example, requires modifications in bottling operations that take time an
money. And switching from paper to plastic bags requires a supermarket to invest in bag
holders and to train employees.
The sort of switching we are considering requires time to effect. That time is
generally required to switch to a different input is not surprising. But time can be required
even to switch between suppliers of a similar input. For example, concern with precision
and quality control sometimes lead manufacturers to "qualify" only a few potential
suppliers, since the qualification process may require time and investment by both the
manufacturer and the potential supplier. Porter (1985, p.286) describes the cas£ of a
computer manufacturer that took one year to qualify a supplier for a 64K chip. As another
example, most major domestic textile manufacturers generally qualify only domestic
polyester fiber producers, a process taking time and money, 4 but the textile manufacturers
could switch to foreign sources of fiber by making the expense and taking the time to
qualify foreign suppliers. 5 Finally, manufacturers of aircraft jet turbine engines typically
qualify only a few (sometimes only one) of the potential suppliers of superprecision
bearings, since the qualification process is very costly and can take up to five years.
The variety of customer-specific sunk costs.
Customer-specific sunk investments arise in many forms. For example, Hammermesh
4
It is important that the fiber does not "gum up" the looms which are very costly to shut
down.
5 The expense and time involved arises from making test runs on their working looms.
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and Gordon (nd, p.4) found that in the steel can industry, ".. plants were often set up to
supply a particular customer, [so that] the loss of a large order from that customer could
greatly cut into the manufacturing efficiency and company profits." Similar dependencies
on customers exist in the glass container industry, where, for example, a particular plant
may be largely specialized to a particular bottle for a particular customer that requires
specific investments in terms of molds and down time if production must be switched. In
other cases, customer-specific investments are more subtle, involving investments in
qualifying with a customer. 6 For example, the customer list of an industrial firm is
generally an asset with significant value to an acquirer of the firm. The value of the list
generally does not arise because it reveals otherwise-unknown potential customers. Instead,
its value arises because it reflects the relationship between the firm and its customers, i.e.,
the firm is a qualified supplier for that customer. A good customer is one that will
continue buying from the firm as long as its prices are competitive. For such a customer the
firm does not have to bear the qualification costs for each new sale.
Summary and outline of the paper
To summarize, in this paper we examine the effect of the ability of customers to
make credible, but costly and time consuming threats to switch suppliers on the exercise of
short run market power by incumbent suppliers. We show that the length of time and level
of the investment required to switch to a new input or newly qualified vendor provides
incumbent suppliers with strategic leverage, but that customer-specific investments by
suppliers provides strategic leverage to buyers. The result of these two forms of leverage is
likely to be more competitive pricing than would be suggested by entry protected short run
market power.
In connection with our experience with antitrust investigations at the FTC we have
6 Here we use qualification in a general sense, including, for example, the need for the
salesman to develop a relationship with the purchasing agent.
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observed that customers of concentrated industries often have no complaint with major
mergers of their suppliers. We postulate that an important reason for this is that customers
have strategic options, including their ability to make credible threats to eventually obtain
alternative sources of supply, and that such strategies have the apparent effect of
substantially moderating the exercise of short run market power by incumbent suppliers. 7
This, despite the fact that the short run can be lengthy and costly,8 and that buyers'
apparent demand curves have sometimes been extremely inelastic. 9 This paper, then,
provides an analytical foundation to such admittedly anecdotal evidence.
Although in oligopoly models with well informed entrants there is no role for limit
pricing (pre-entry prices are irrelevant to the entry calculus), and sunk costs allow
incumbents to raise price without fear of de novo entry, in our model with credible
switching, limit pricing (against switching) is a likely form of equilibrium. 10 In addition,
contrary to traditional oligopoly theory, the limit price declines with the level of customer-
specific sunk costs, and the limit price may be at approximately the competitive level, even
in the presence of substantial potential short run market power. Therefore, with credible
7 One particularly striking example was the supcrprecision bearings for commercial jet
turbine aircraft engines described above. As the consequence of a proposed merger in this
industry, reviewed during the 1980's by the Federal Trade Commission, some of the jet
turbine engine manufacturers (for commercial aircraft) would be confronted by a sole
source for some of their bearings, and because of the qualification process, new suppliers
could not be qualified for five years. These manufacturers, however, were not concerned
by being faced with a "monopoly" supplier post-merger, despite having no enforceable long
term contracts. We postulate that one important factor behind their lack of concern is that
the supcrprecision bearing producers make substantial sunk investments. (Further
information cannot be disclosed because of federal confidentiality statutes).
8 A costly five year qualification period in the case of some superprecision bearings,
and a costly period of at least a few months for polyester fiber.
9 Due to fixed proportions and the minor role of the bearings in total value added, the
short run demand for particular superprecision bearings is extremely inelastic.
10 See Milgrom and Roberts (1982) for a framework in which limit pricing arises as an
equilibrium in the presence of uninformed entrants.
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switching and customer-specific sunk costs, actual market power will generally be
significantly less than the apparent short run market power that would be indicated by
customers' apparent demand elasticities.
Besides our contribution to oligopoly theory, our analysis has significant
implications for merger enforcement. Under the 1984 Department of Justice Merger
Guidelines, markets are defined and concentration measured according to what products a
customer would switch to in response to a short run anticompetitive price increase by its
current suppliers. 11 If the buyer cannot switch and entry could not occur in the short run,
a merger resulting in a significant increase in concentration in a concentrated market is
presumed likely to lead to higher prices. In this paper we show that this presumption is not
generally correct in markets in which the customers can make credible commitments to
switch.
In the next section we set out a simple general model of switching that includes
vertical integration as one type of switching. In the following section we then present a
more general approach to switching suppliers, in which credible switching may require the
actions of more than one buyer. We show that the results are similar to the vertical
integration model. The final section of the paper examines the implications of our analysis
for the Department of Justice Merger Guidelines.
II. The General Model
In our models incumbent suppliers are sheltered from de novo entry by sunk costs.
But in intermediate product industries buyers may be the most likely "entrants," either by
vertical integration, contracting with entrants, or switching to alternative inputs or
suppliers. 12 After all, it is intuitively more plausible that unhappy customers rather than
11 See DOJ (1984) and Scheffman and Spiller (1987a).
For a nice example of a purchaser arranging for entry by contract, see "GE
Refrigerator Woes Illustrate the Hazards in Changing a Product," Wall Street Journal , May
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a de novo entrant would perceive market power, especially an increased exercise of market
power as might arise from a merger. Sexton and Sexton (1987) show that for a group of
buyers (in their case, an agricultural cooperative) considering vertical integration, the entry
calculus of standard oligopoly theory is incorrect. A de novo entrant has to expect to make
at least a normal rate of return on his investment for entry to be profitable. But what is
relevant to a buyer is whether his total profits if he "enters" are larger or smaller than his
profits in the alternative of facing oligopoly pricing. That is, pre-entry prices are related to
the entry decision of a buyer.
We show in this section that if suppliers have customer- specific investments, and
buyers can make credible threats to switch but that switching requires time and customer-
specific investments, then the resulting equilibrium pricing will differ from that predicted
by models featuring sunk costs as entry barriers (e.g. Spence (1977), Dixit (1980)). Since we
intend to highlight the role played by the ability of buyers to make strategic commitments,
the models are constructed so that if buyers were characterized simply as demand curves,
entry would be blockaded by sunk costs and Bertrand competition.
We begin with a market with one buyer and one seller in an infinite horizon
framework. This addresses a case in which suppliers have significant customer-specific
investments. The case of one buyer has a broader application than may be initially
anticipated. In intermediate product industries, although there are generally price lists,
transactions prices are typically determined by bargaining between the sales and purchasing
agents, and prices generally differ across customers who have imperfect knowledge about
what other customers pay. 13 Under such circumstances, to the extent that a supplier (or
7, 1990, P. 1.
13 Experience at the FTC in reviewing of dozens of intermediate good industries in
connection with merger investigations shows a marked lack of uniformity of prices across
customers. See also Stiglcr and Kindahl (1970).
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supplier oligopoly) has significant customer-specific sunk costs, our single buyer model will
apply.
In later sections we develop models with multiple buyers and finite horizons. The
multiple buyer case addresses a situation in which a supplier's investments are specific to a
group of buyers. Our multiple buyer model shows that the ability to make credible threats
to switch generates an equilibrium price dispersion in a model where if firms would be
considered simply as demand curves, buyers would be charged identical prices. Finally, we
show that the basic results are obtained in a finite horizon model.
A. A Single Buyer, Infinite Horizon Model
Suppose that the single buyer, B, has an inelastic demand for one unit of the relevant
input, widgets, which is produced by a single seller, S, both facing an infinite horizon. 14 B
can purchase an alternative input at a price, a, from a competitive industry. This input has
other uses, and will be produced at price a whether or not B purchases it. Widgets are
preferred by B as long as their price is not greater than a. In the longer run B can switch to
an alternative input, gadgets (or, in one model, vertically integrate into widgets). We will
discuss the economics of such switching in a moment.
Supplier economics :
The assumptions about the supplier's condition are as follows. The marginal
production costs for serving B are c s. The assets devoted to serving B have book value of I s .
A portion of these assets are customer-specific, with 7l
s
being the salvage value of the
assets that are dedicated to B (thus, the extent of specificity of the seller's assets is
14 The basic results derived from this formulation would hold for more general
downward sloping demand functions as well. Since in the current formulation there are no
inefficiencies associated with a price above marginal cost, there is no need for vertical
integration or for multiple part tariffs to either extract monopoly rents or solve a
successive-monopoly problem. This allows us to focus on the use of credible switching
strategies.
< 9 >
represented by l-7<0- We assume that supplying widgets to B is profitable even in the
event that S has B as a customer for only T periods (after which time, for example, B
switches to an alternative input) as long as during that time it can sell its widgets to B at a
price just below a (that is, (a-c
8
)(l-6T) > I(l-5)). 15
Switching economics :
B can switch to an alternative input, gadgets. Switching requires an irreversible
investment decision of IB (which for technical convenience, is payable at time T), that
results in a switch to gadgets at time T. After switching, by assumption, B can no longer use
widgets (without making an investment of time and money). Thus, switching involves a
change in B's production process that makes widgets incompatible or uneconomic. This
assumption can be interpreted in a number of ways. B might have to replace some
machinery or change the final product in order to use gadgets. Alternatively, the use of
gadgets may require adjusting machinery (implying machine down time) or qualifying
gadgets - with either process being costly and time consuming. Finally, the switching may
involve vertical integration by B who is no longer, then, a customer for the previous
supplier because of B's ability to obtain the input at marginal cost.
The marginal cost of gadgets for B after switching (at time T) are cB. In the case of
switching by vertical integration, cB is marginal production costs.
16 In the case of
switching to an alternative input, cB is the price B has to pay for the alternative input. We
assume that widgets are the economically efficient inputs for the buyer, in the sense that
the total ex ante average total cost of supplying widgets to B (given the investment in B-
specific assets) are less than the ex ante average total costs of gadgets (the next best
15 We are assuming here that fixed investments cannot be sold in the period they are
used for production (notice that (l-<5) = r/(l+r)).
16
In the vertical integration interpretation, widgets and gadgets are obviously perfect
substitutes.
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alternative), i.e.,
c
s
* (l-5)/
s
< cB * (1-6)/,. (1)
We also assume that switching is more profitable for B than paying a for gadgets in
perpetuity, i.e.,
-IB(\-b)b
T
+ (a-c^S 7" > , (2)
where 8 is the discount rate (6 = l/(l+r), for interest rate r). 17
Given assumption (2), if the buyer had the option of using an alternative input
consistent with (2) ex ante, it must be explained why ex post he is captive to his supplier.
One possibility is that a structural change in his supplier's market, such as a merger,
occurred after the buyer committed to his current input use. For example, suppose that the
buyer originally had two widget suppliers merged after the buyer's commitment to widgets.
This situation is of particular interest for merger analysis and the proper implementation of
the Merger Guidelines. But our model provides a more general explanation. If reliance on
the supplier is economically efficient (minimizes social costs), we will show that there are
equilibria in which the buyer is assured a price that makes choice of the efficient supplier
profitable, despite being captive to that supplier in the short run, even without enforceable
contracts.
Switching via vertical integration :
The model we have sketched thus far easily incorporates switching through vertical
integration. Suppose, for example, that rather than switching to an alternative input, B has
access to exactly the same technology of producing widgets as used by S. Then c
s
= c B , and
I
s
= I B . This will be the case when B vertically integrates physically or enters into a
1 7
Recall that the investment expense, I B , is incurred at the time the plant is completed,
T periods after the commitment to switch. Also, (1) assumes that during the T periods
before B can actually switch, B buys widgets from S at a price just below a.
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contract with a new widget producer. Assume that with more than one producer
competition in the widget industry results in Bertrand (i.e. marginal cost) pricing. 18
Finally, suppose that S has just started production, with no prior contractual arrangement
with B. 19 Under these assumptions, if B is passive, S is protected from entry by sunk costs
and post-entry Bertrand competition, and so S can sell widgets at the monopoly price, a,
without stimulating de novo entry. That is, under these conditions it would not pay a de
novo entrant to enter as a widget supplier. Nonetheless, by (2) it pays for B to switch (i.e. to
vertically integrate) rather than paying a in perpetuity.
1. A Simultaneous Move Game.
To begin, consider a game with simultaneous moves by B and S. Given that the
buyer makes a commitment to switch, the seller's best response is to charge the monopoly
price in all future subgames. Similarly, if the buyer expects the seller to charge the
monopoly price in all future periods, since by assumption, switching is more profitable than
paying a, then B's best response is to switch during the first period. A subgame perfect
equilibrium in this game has the seller charging the monopoly price, a, for T periods and
exiting, and the buyer committing to switch in the first period. 20 Since, by assumption,
switching is inefficient, the equilibrium is inefficient. 21
The simultaneous move game, then, yields an equilibrium that looks like the
standard oligopoly model result. S, sheltered from competition for T periods sets the
18 The model could easily incorporate any post-entry equilibrium concept that makes
independent entry unprofitable.
19 Our analysis could easily be modified to model a situation where S and B bargain ex-
ante over the purchase by B of the widget technology.
20 The equilibrium is subgame perfect because once B vertically integrates, all
subsequent (T-l) subgames will feature a price of a.
21 Because of our assumption of inelastic demand there is only technical inefficiency,
no allocative inefficiency.
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monopoly price. But this is a result that may not be in the interest of either B or S, as can
be seen from the inefficiency of the equilibrium. Of course if B and S could costlessly
write enforceable contracts, there would be no switching by S. We will show that this result
can also arise as a result of market equilibrium in non-cooperative, non-simultaneous move
games. In order to describe such games, we first examine the tradeoffs involved for B and S
for switching by B.
2. Tradeoffs involved in switching.
Consider a hypothetical scenario (not an equilibrium or strategy) in which as long as
B does not switch, the price is P <a, but if B switches the price reverts to a. (Below we
discuss games with strategies of this type).
Tradeoffs for B
For it not to be in B's interest to switch, purchasing at PL forever must be at least as
profitable for B as switching. That is, P L must satisfy 22
-IB(l-6)b
T
+ (a-cg)6
r < a-P L
,
(3a)
where the left hand side (LHS) of (3a) is the per period profitability of switching, and the
right hand side (RHS) is the per period profitability of paying P L forever. 23,24 The PL
22 Recall that by assumption the investment costs are not borne until the switch is
operational. This is the reason for I B being discounted.
23 The buyer's calculus is made assuming that he can buy the alternative input at a price
of q, so that a can be thought as his maximum willingness to pay for widgets. Notice that
(3a) can be interpreted as a one period condition in the following way. Since the buyer can
decide each period whether or not to vertically integrate, what is foregone this period by
not vertically integrating is postponing integration by one period. The RHS of (3a) is the
current period's surplus from taking price P and not vertically integrating this period. The
LHS is the cost of delaying vertical integration by one period.
24 Observe that dividing both sides of (3a) by 1-5 we obtain that for B not to switch, the
profitability of switching (in present value form) has to be less than the profitability of
paying P L forever (in present value form).
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that makes (3a) an equality, P^^, leaves the buyer indifferent over switching. 25
We might call P^ the "Bain limit price" in the sense of the traditional limit pricing
models (e.g. Bain (1956), Modigliani (1958)), because it leaves the buyer indifferent between
"entering" (switching) or not. Notice that P^^ increases with average costs, the entry lag T,
and with the rate of time preference 8, but that P^ax is invariant to the level of the seller's
sunk costs ((1-7)1), but increases with the buyer's switching costs. By (2), Pmax < a.
Tradeoffs for S
For it to be profitable for S to sell at a price P L instead of charging the monopoly
price a for T periods and then exiting, P L must satisfy:
P L-c
s
> (a-cpa-6 7) + yI£\-b)b T (3b)
where the left hand side (LHS) of (3b) is the per period profitability of charging PL forever,
and the RHS is the per period profitability of charging the monopoly price for T periods
and then exiting (see also footnote 23). The P L that solves (3b) with equality, P^in , leaves
the seller indifferent between charging that price forever, and charging the monopoly price
for T periods and then selling his B-specific assets. 26
F*min falls with the extent of specificity of the seller's investments, but increases with
the entry lag, T. Thus, if sunk costs are so large that P^in is below long run average costs
(LRAC), then if the equilibrium price was given by Pmin , tne original investment by S
would have been unprofitable, in which case widgets would only have been produced, if at
25 In terms of the one period interpretation of (3a) discussed in the previous footnote,
^max J ust compensates the buyer for delaying vertical integration by one period.
26 As with (3a), (3b) can be given a one period interpretation. If the seller charges P L
instead of a this period, he gives up (a - P L ) this period. If charging P L delays the buyer's
vertical integration by one period, the seller gains (a-c)<5T - ( 1 -6)-yI s 5
T
,
where the first term
is the gain from being able to charge a at time T (because delaying vertical integration this
period means that the buyer will not be integrated at time T), and the second term is the
costs of scrapping the seller's recoverable assets one period later than time T. P^in exactly
compensates the seller for the buyer postponing vertical integration by one period.
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all, by a vertically integrated B. This is the Klein-Crawford-Alchian result. If the entry
lag is large enough, however, P^in>LRAC, and independent production by S is feasible even
if PL=P L . .11 * mm
For conditions (3a) and (3b) to hold, PL must
satisfy:
a(l-5 7) + c
s
6 T + y(l-6)Z Tl
s
* P L < ad-5 7) + cB6
T
+ (1-5)5%. (3c)
The range of prices satisfied by (3c) are those for which neither B or S would do
better by having B switch. By (1), there are PL's that satisfy (3c), and by (2) such PL's are
less than a. Next, we show that there are market games with equilibria consisting of
constant prices P L satisfying (3c) and no switching.
3. Sequential Games
Intuitively, there must be market equilibria that do not involve switching. From S's
perspective, given that there are alternatives more profitable than having B switch,
charging a price below a and waiting to see whether B switches seems like an obvious
strategy. The cost of such a strategy is that S loses the difference between a and the lower
price he charges for one period. But as shown by (3b), there are prices below a for which
this would be profitable, if B did not switch. Because of the prisoners' dilemma nature of
the simultaneous move game, such an outcome cannot be a Nash equilibrium of that game.
Therefore, we turn our attention to sequential move games.
We begin by describing two sequential move non-cooperative games: one in which P^ ax is
a subgame perfect equilibrium, and another in which P^
in
is a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Neither equilibrium involves switching. We will then show that bargaining games will
support any price between P^ and P^ as subgame perfect equilibria.
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Consider first a game of Markovian strategies, 27 where the seller quotes a price PL
which is valid as long as the buyer does not make a commitment to switch during that
period, and where no bargaining is possible between S and B. If B does not make a
commitment to switch, then B pays a price of a to S, since charging a then becomes a
dominant strategy for S. Conditioned on S's offer, B decides whether or not to switch. This
game, then, has S as a Stackelberg leader. Since no bargaining is allowed, S's offer is
credible, and by (3a), B's best response to any price at or below P^^ is to not switch. Given
B's optimal decision rule, S's optimal strategy is to offer a contract price of P^^. This
game, then, yields the "Bain limit price" as a subgame perfect equilibrium, with no vertical
integration.
Consider now a game where B is the Stackelberg leader. In this game B offers to S
not to commit to switch if S supplies one unit at a price P L. If the seller does not accept this
offer, then B switches and purchases from S, as in the previous game, at a price of a.
Again, since no bargaining between S and B is allowed, B's offer is credible, and by (3b) S's
best response to any contract price at or above P^in is to accept the contract. Given S's
optimal decision rule, B's optimal strategy is to offer a contract price of P^in . Thus, this
game, in which B is a Stackelberg leader, yields the "Klein-Crawford-Alchian price" as a
subgame perfect equilibrium.
We have shown, then, that there are games that yield limit pricing and no switching
as subgame perfect equilibria. These are models in which either the seller or the buyer have
a first mover advantage, and no bargaining is permitted. The two games just described are
extreme forms of bargaining games. In more general bargaining games, any P L satisfying
27 This type of strategics relate current actions only to last period outcomes, implying
that the optimal decision depends only on the node being played. When the strategy space is
not restricted to Markovian strategies, then non-constant price strategies may arise. For
example, the seller may choose a strategy that consists on charging a for, say, two periods,
and some price below a for the next, say, five periods. If this pricing pattern is preferred
by the buyer to vertical integration, it may also arise as an equilibrium. This pattern also
involves limit pricing, since the average price, over time, will be below a.
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(3c) could arise as a subgame perfect equilibrium. One example is the Nash bargaining
solution, which results in an equilibrium limit price that is the average of the two
reservation prices,
pLb - « " [«-^]* r * o r(l-5)^. «)
Notice that P^h increases with the time it takes to switch, T, but falls with the
extent of sunkness of the seller's investment, and with the rate of time preference 6.
Define limit pricing equilibria as those equilibria featuring a price below a and no
switching. Then, although limit pricing equilibria may involve prices above marginal costs,
because of the inelastic demand assumption, there is no reduction in welfare, 29 and so
limit pricing equilibria are efficient. Equilibria with switching are inefficient by
assumption. In summary, we can state:
Proposition 1: Assuming: (a) a single buyer, and (b) switching is credible, then there
are infinite horizon sequential games with subgame perfect limit pricing equilibria.
Limit prices are in the range specified by (3c). These equilibria are efficient.
The result presented in Proposition 1 is in sharp contrast to the equilibrium that
would arise if the buyer side was simply treated as a demand curve. In that case, S would
charge the monopoly price for at least T periods. Instead, when B can make a credible
threat to switch, all equilibria involve average long run prices below the monopoly price,
28 Since payoffs are linear in prices, the bargaining frontier is linear with a slope of -1.
Observe that the no agreement outcome is given by vertical integration and monopoly
pricing for T periods, implying a profit level for the buyer similar to that obtained from
P
max' anc* a P™ 1^ level for the seller similar to that obtained from P^in .
29 In a model with a more general demand function, multiple part tariffs may arise, and
the relevant limit price may take the form of a surcharge on inframarginal units.
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either because of vertical switching following T periods of monopoly price, or because of
limit pricing.
The role of sunk costs
Observe that a critical parameter determining the range of equilibrium limit prices
is the extent of sunk investments ((1-7)1). For example in the case of switching by vertical
integration where B has access to the same technology as S, if there are no sunk costs (7=1),
only PL
=Pmax s°l ves (3c). This is because in this case if the seller has no sunk costs, the
buyer has no leverage over the seller. If 7<1, in the vertical integration case (i.e. with I B=I S ,
c
s
=cB ) there is a range of equilibrium limit prices that satisfy (3c). In the case of general
switching, I B ,I s,c s,cB must be such that (1) holds. It is likely, for example, that cB>c s , if the
new input is purchased, since cB is then the market price of gadgets, while c s is the
marginal cost of widgets (which is less than average cost). In the "Bain limit pricing" model,
PL equals P^ax ano- ' s independent of the level of sunk investments, but increases with long
run average costs and the entry lag. If PL is determined ala Klein-Crawford-Alchian, P L
equals P^in and falls with the amount of sunk costs that the buyer can expropriate from the
seller.
If PL is determined by a bargaining process, then the particular characteristics of B
and S determining their relative bargaining power and the nature of the bargaining game
will be critical. Since sunk costs provide what leverage the buyer has over the seller, and
the entry lag is the leverage that the seller has over the buyer, we would expect that, in
general, the limit price would be a decreasing function of sunk costs and an increasing
function of the entry lag, as in the Nash bargaining solution.
Although the basic model here is quite simple, leaving aside the assumption of
buyer-specific sunk costs and pricing, only two of the basic assumptions are critical to the
basic results: that decisions are sequential, and that the buyer's decision to commit to
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switch is irreversible and immediately observable.30 Both assumptions appear reasonable.
It is unlikely to be rational for the buyer to make an irrevocable decision prior to knowing
the price he has to pay. And a buyer can presumably make an irreversible decision by
contract. The fact that the seller knows that the buyer can make an irreversible
commitment is what gives the buyer leverage over the seller.
4. Variable Sunk Costs
A main result of the theory of the firm developed by Coase and Williamson is that
technology and organizational form are related. Sellers whose investments are at risk have
an incentive to choose technologies that reduce their exposure. As a consequence, equilibria
without vertical integration of B and S may not be efficient. For example, it may result in
a level of sunk investment that is lower, and a marginal production cost that is higher than
optimal.31 If technology is chosen unilaterally by S, the resulting equilibrium may require
switching, even in games in which for an exogenously given 7, the equilibrium would
involve limit pricing. 32 And if the buyer can make strategic decision ex ante, he may alter
his switching opportunities in order to affect the ex post equilibrium. If S has not yet
30 This decision, instead of physical vertical integration, could be interpreted as a long
term contract with an entrant.
31 In our model this can be motivated in the following way. Let there be a tradeoff
between sunkness ((I-7) in our model) and marginal costs, c, so that c=c(7), and let S
determine the value of 7 unilaterally (assume, for simplicity, the vertical integration case,
so that I S=I B , Cs=c b)- ^ ct 1 re P resent tne level of sunkness that minimizes operating costs
(i.e., c'(7*)=0, with c"(7*)<0). Suppose that P L is determined as the solution of a simple
bargaining process that results in PL being the average of the upper and lower bounds given
in (3a) and (3b), i.e., P L = (\-S T)a + [c(7*)+c(7)]6T/2 + (!-5)6TI(l+7)/2. Then total expected
profits of the would-be monopolist are given by V = [a-(c(7)+c(7*')/2]( l-6T)/(l-6) +
I[<5
T(l+7)/2 - 1], and the first order condition, V =0, is c = <5T I(1 -<$)/( 1-6T ) > 0. If c is
monotone in 7, the equilibrium values of c and 7 exceed c and 7 respectively.
32
If S has already entered with an inefficient technology, there may not be a limit
price that satisfies (3c), and so the seller's profits are maximized by charging the monopoly
price for T periods and exiting, forcing the buyer to vertically integrate. Observe, that for
the limit price PL to be an equilibrium, (3c) requires that c(7)<c(7*)+(l-6)I(l-7), which may
be violated by S's choice of technology. The incentives to vertically integration discussed
here arc analogous to those discussed in Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978).
< 19 >
entered, the efficient outcome involves the buyer buying the innovation from the seller.33
III. Extensions.
The models we have presented above all involve a single buyer and a single seller,
both with infinite horizons. In this section we show that limit price and no switching is a
likely equilibrium also if we relax those two assumptions. To simplify the discussion, we
develop this section for the vertical integration case. That is we assume that IB=I S and
cB=c s , and that B can vertically integrate physically or by contract. The results are easily
shown to follow for the general switching model.
A. A Single Buyer, Finite Horizon Model
In a perfect information finite horizon game, the usual game-theoretic result is that
there are only prisoners' dilemma-like subgame perfect equilibria. If that result would hold
for the models considered here, all equilibria would involve vertical integration. In the
type of games we have discussed, however, since the game is sequential and B's commitment
decision is irreversible and observable, other outcomes are possible. In particular, in the
finite horizon case, there are sequential games with subgame perfect equilibria involving no
switching.
Let T+N be the length of the game and T+M be the minimum length of period
necessary for switching to be profitable in the absence of a widget producer. Assuming
away the integer constraint, M solves
-7(1
-6)6 r + 5 r(a-c)(l-6 w) - 0. (5 >
If N<M, the unique equilibrium is for S to charge the monopoly price from the
beginning, and B not to switch. If N>M, however, we show in the Appendix that there arc
33 The transaction price should at least equal the profits that independent production
would provide the seller. There is, however, a joint gain equal to [c(7)-c(7*)]/(l-<5) which
will be shared by both the buyer and the seller.
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finite horizon games with limit price equilibria. For example, P^ (P^in ) is the unique
subgame perfect equilibrium in games in which S (B) is allowed to give an offer that B (S)
has to either accept or refuse. Other bargaining games yield prices between P^^ and P^in .
Thus,
Proposition 2: Assuming: (a) a single buyer, and (b) switching is credible, then there
are sequential games with finite horizon larger than T+M, with limit price subgame
perfect equilibria. The range of limit prices is that given by (3c), except for the
period T+M+l before the last where the lower bound is below that in (3c). (See
details in the Appendix.) During the last T+M periods, the price is a.
B. A Multiple Buyers, Infinite Horizon Model
Since in this section we deal with multiple buyers, to make the analysis tractable we
assume that the seller's sunk costs are market rather than customer-specific. As a
consequence, buyers may have to act jointly to make credible commitments to switch. As in
the previous section, for simplicity, we focus on the case of switching via vertical
integration, physically or by contract. We show that most of the results of the single buyer-
infinite horizon case still hold with multiple buyers, if buyers can contract, or if at least
one buyer is large enough. When customers are of different sizes, we explore the
implications of price discrimination. Here we find that price discrimination is not related
to demand elasticities, but rather to the ability to switch. Furthermore, since switching is
inefficient, price discrimination by deterring switching is socially efficient.
Assume that there are n buyers, each demanding S; units of the good, with ZjS~l, and
that vertically integration still requires a production capacity of 1 unit, enough to supply
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the whole market.34
1. Multiple Buyers with Contracting
Assume first that buyers have the ability to write long term contracts with any input
supplier (including a vertically integrating buyer). Assume also that a buyer deciding to
vertically integrate can contract in advance to supply his product to the remaining, non-
integrated, buyers. 35 We analyze first the vertical integration subgame among the buyers.
This subgame determines which buyer vertically integrates and the contract price at which
he sells to the remaining non-integrated buyers. Buyers in this subgame make offers to each
other consisting of a decision to vertically integrate and a long term contract price. These
offers are contingent on all buyers signing the contract. Competition among buyers results
in the profitability for the buyer that vertically integrates equalling that for the buyers
that do not, so that if buyer i integrates it will sell (1-S;) units to the remaining n-1 buyers at
average cost, each at a price of [c+( 1-5)1]. It is easily seen that there is a limit price
equilibrium with PL specified by (3c). 36 Thus,
Proposition 3: Propositions 1 and 2 hold for the case of multiple buyers when all
have the ability to write long term contracts.
2. Multiple Buyers without Contracting
34 The assumption of buyers' inelastic demands avoids potential raising rivals' costs'
considerations for vertical integration, as discussed in Salop and Schcffman (1983), (1987)
and Katz (1987).
35
In this section, vertical integration can be interpreted as writing a long term contract
with an independent entrant.
36 For vertical integration not to be a profitable strategy for any buyer, the price
charged by S (P L ) has to satisfy < -I( l-5)6 T/n + (a-c)ST/n] < (a-PL)/n, which is exactly
condition (3a) developed for the case of a single buyer. P L has to provide S with no lower
profits than charging a price of a for T periods and then exiting. That is, (a-c)(l-<5 T ) +
7l(l-5)5T <(P L-c), which is exactly condition (3b) developed for the case of a single buyer.
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We now show that when buyers cannot write long term contracts, as long as vertical
integration is profitable at a minimum scale of I, there is a limit price equilibrium.
Assume first the case of identical buyers (i.e., s—l/n), and that in the absence of a
widget producer, all can profitably vertical integrate. That is,
-/(1-5) + 5l£ > o. (6)
n
If 7=0, i.e., the seller has no recoverable assets, then once a buyer vertically
integrates,37 both share the remaining (n-l)/n units, at a price of c. But there is a basic
externality in the entry decision. The buyer that vertically integrates bears the cost of the
investment but by driving the price down to marginal cost provides all other buyers with a
windfall. This subgame is similar to that in Dixit and Shapiro (1985). The full game has
multiple subgame perfect limit price equilibria. The upper bound to the equilibrium limit
prices increases with the number of buyers, and exceeds that of the limit price when there
is a single buyer.
If 7>0, all equilibria in the buyers' vertical integration subgame involve more than
one buyer vertically integrating. Observe that since the seller has recoverable assets the
seller prefers to exit rather than sell at marginal cost. Thus, if a single buyer vertically
integrates it becomes a monopolist, generating incentives for further vertical integration.
These results are presented in Proposition 4, and are proved in the Appendix.
Proposition 4: Assuming: (a) multiple and identical buyers, (b) none able to write
long term contracts, and (c) vertical integration is credible for all buyers, then there
37 Because of the Bcrtrand assumption, which implies marginal cost pricing, the
incumbent obtains zero net operating profits following entry. Thus, if 7>0 the incumbent
will leave the market following entry. The incumbent's exit, however, implies that the
entrant replaces the incumbent as the monopolist. Thus, to assure that the incumbent
remains in the market we assume that 7=0. However, if the post-entry game provided the
entrant with a positive net revenue in excess of its non-sunk investments, the assumption of
7=0 would not be needed.
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are infinite horizon sequential games with limit pricing as subgame perfect
equilibria. When the limit pricing equilibria exist, the upper bound to the
equilibrium limit prices increases in n and exceeds that given by (3c). The lower
bound is no lower than that in (3c).
3. Different Size Buyers
Consider now the case when buyers are of different sizes. In particular, suppose
there is only one buyer, demanding z<l units, for whom, in the absence of a market for
widgets, it is profitable to vertically integrate, while vertical integration is not profitable
for the remaining n-1 buyers, each demanding a share Sj<z. That is
-7(1-5)5 T + z(cc-c)5 r > > -7(1-6)6 T + s.(a-c)6 T
,
(7)
for Sj<z.
Thus, there is a critical value, z , for the market share of the large buyer that makes
vertical integration profitable, with z = I(l-6)/(a-c). Assume first that 7=0. Then, in the
same way as in previous sections, we can see that there arc limit price equilibria with PL
given by 38,39
38 Observe that the large buyer will prefer to pay a price P L forever instead of
vertically integrating only if
< -I(1-5)5T + z(a-c)5T < z(a-P L ). (3a")
Similarly, a seller with no recoverable assets will prefer to charge a price below a that
precludes vertical integration, only if his profits must exceed those from charging a
monopoly price. That is,
(a-c)(l-6T)/(l-5)<(P L-c)/(l-5). (3b")
Thus, combining (3a") and (3b") we obtain (3c') in the text.
39 Assume, for the moment, that P L takes the value given by its upper bound in (3a').
For z<z limit pricing will not develop, since the large buyer will obtain a negative surplus
from vertical integration. At z=z , PL is exactly a. For values larger than z*, P L is a
decreasing function of z. Furthermore, as z converges to 1, P L converges to the limit price
specified in (3c) for the case of a single buyer. As long as the actual limit price is some
function of its upper bound, this result will hold. However, at z=z , P L may be less than a.
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a - (a-c)Z T 4 P L < a - (a-c)5 r + AIzMl (3c')
z
When 7>0, however, the seller will leave the market following entry, thus providing
the large buyer with a monopoly. 40 In this case, the vertical integration calculus for the
large buyer is different. Now the large buyer's profits from vertical integration are larger,
and are given by its own surplus plus that from all the small buyers. Hence, it will require
a lower P L so as not to vertically integrate. PL is given by
-7(1-5)6 T + (a-c)6 T i (a-P L), (8 )
which is exactly the condition in the single buyer case given by (3a). 41 Thus, the limit
price is lower than if S had no recoverable assets.
Assume now that the seller can discriminate. The seller will then charge a to all
small buyers, but a lower limit price to the large buyer. 42 In particular, the lower bound
for the limit price is given by
PLn ~ a ~ («"<0— + Y/5 7" —- < a - (a-c)5 r + Y/5 r(l-5), (3a')
z z
where the right hand side represents P^
in
when the seller cannot price discriminate. 43
That is, if the seller could price discriminate, it would prefer to transfer to the large buyer
up to all the profits from the smaller buyers rather than have the buyer vertically integrate.
4 While both the seller and the buyer have some recoverable assets, the buyer will
always chose to stay, since, by assumption, its investment was profitable.
41 As in the single buyer case, the vertically integrating buyer captures all the surplus.
42 See Katz (1987) for an analysis of the welfare effects of third-degree price
discrimination in intermediate goods industries.
43 Observe that when the seller can price discriminate, he will prefer charging P L
forever only if (a-c)( l-z)/( 1-6) + (P L-c)z/( 1-5) > (a-c)( 1-<$ T)/(1-S) + 7 I6
T(l-<5). After
rearranging terms we obtain the expression in the text.
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Observe, however, that if we were modeling this industry treating buyers as simply
demand curves, they would all be charged the same price, a, as their demands have the same
reservation price. Once the differential abilities to threaten to vertically integrate are
taken into account, however, price discrimination arises in equilibrium. Even if the buyers
had downward sloping demand curves, price discrimination will not be necessarily related
to elasticities, as the incentives to switch would depend on the relative magnitudes of
consumer surplus in the independent or integrated organizational forms. Finally, since
price discrimination is what deters duplicative investment, price discrimination in our
framework is socially efficient.
Thus, we can state
Proposition 5: Assuming: (a) multiple buyers, (b) none able to write long term
contracts, (c) vertical integration is credible only for the largest buyer (with market
share of at least I(l-6)/(a-c)), and (d) the seller cannot price discriminate, then there
are infinite horizon sequential games with limit pricing as subgame perfect
equilibria. If there are no recoverable assets (i.e., 7=0), then the upper bound for the
limit price falls with the market share of the large buyer. If, however, 7>0, the
upper bound to the limit price is that given in (3c). If the seller can price
discriminate, then the lower bound for the limit price is below that given in (3c).
IV. Implications for Antitrust Analysis under the Merger Guidelines
The Department of Justice's 1982 Merger Guidelines introduced a new approach to the
antitrust analysis of market definition and entry barriers. Market definition is based on
whether buyers would switch their purchases within a short period of time in sufficient
volume to render a hypothetical anticompetitive price increase unprofitable. The
Guidelines' barriers test is based on whether entry or its threat would prevent a merger-to-
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monopoly from profitably exercising significant market power for a period of more than
two years. There are analytical problems with the Guidelines' barriers test which we will
discuss momentarily.
There are a number of analytical and policy problems with the Guidelines market
definition and barriers criteria. A significant shortcoming of the Guidelines, we believe, is
they do not envisage a role for strategic buyers when buyers are captive for more than a
short period of time. We have shown that even if buyers are captive for a considerable
period of time, they may have strategies available to ameliorate apparent market power
created by a merger of suppliers. Therefore, the market definition methodology adopted by
the Guidelines may result in narrower markets than would be reflected by exercised market
power.
The underlying intuition of the Guidelines' barriers criterion seems to be as follows.
Suppose a merger-to-monopoly, and that entry takes two years. Then if price was raised to
the monopoly level, entry would result within two years. But such a scenario is unlikely to
occur. First, models featuring sunk costs as entry barriers show that if incumbents have
sufficient sunk costs, entry may never occur, independent of the amount of time it would
take to enter. Second, we have shown that if sellers have significant sunk costs, and buyers
are the most likely entrants, 44 a merger-to-monopoly is not likely to lead to monopoly
pricing followed by entry.
By (3a), P^
ax
makes the buyer indifferent between paying the limit price in
perpetuity and vertically integrating and paying the monopoly price for T periods. Thus a
merger-to-monopoly could extract aj. most the equivalent of monopoly pricing for the period
it would take to enter. 45 The actual value of the limit price depends, however, on the
44 Entry can take the form of vertical integration, contracting with entrants, or
investing in switching costs.
45 Formally, using (3a), the discounted value of the limit price minus average cost (AC),
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relative bargaining strengths of the buyers and the seller, and the structure of the game.
Thus, the limit price may generally be below P^^. Thus, for markets relevant to our
strategic switching models, monopoly pricing for the duration of the entry lag provides an
upper bound to the consumer welfare costs of a merger-to-monopoly. With customer or
market-specific investments, buyers may have sufficient leverage to insure that little if any
market power is exercised as a result of a merger of their suppliers. In general the
Guidelines overestimate the welfare or consumer costs of a merger-to-monopoly.
To sum up, the length of the entry lag is critical in calculating the potential
consumer welfare costs of an anticompetitive merger, since limit pricing results in a
monopoly overcharge that is at most the equivalent of monopoly pricing
until entry.
Bounds can be placed on the potential (percentage) price increase from a merger to
monopoly. For example, if the limit price is given by P^ax' then the monopoly overcharge is
(Pmax"AC )/AC = (l-5T)[(a/AC)-l]. Thus, if the annual rate of discount is 10% and if it takes
two years to enter (T=2), then the price increase will be less than .17 times the monopoly
mark-up. Consequently, if antitrust enforcement deters mergers that could result in a
potential monopoly price increase of 5%, then, in fact, antitrust deters mergers that would
bring a permanent price increase of less than .9%.
V. Final Comments.
This paper has developed an analysis of markets in which: (1) sellers have significant
customer or market-specific investments; (2) buyers can make credible commitments to
obtain alternative sources of supply; but (3) it takes an investment and time to effect a
switch to an alternative source of supply. As explained in the introduction to this paper,
i.e., the monopoly overcharge, is (Pj^-AQ/O-fi) = [P^-tc + I(l-5))]/(l-S)=(l-<5T)(a-c-I( 1
S))/(\S).
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markets with these characteristics are common, since many markets are intermediate
product markets in which suppliers have customer or market-specific investments and
buyers may be the most likely "entrants," or where buyers can make credible commitments
to switch to alternative inputs.
We have shown that in these markets the market power of sellers is significantly less
than would be predicted models with unsophisticated buyers. Current prices and the
switching decision are endogenously determined, with limit pricing being a likely
equilibrium, even in the presence of full information. The limit price is predicted to
increase with the amount of time it takes to enter, the number of buyers, and with the level
of buyers' switching costs, but to fall with the level of sunk investments. Sunk costs,
although representing a potential barrier to entry by independent entrants, are not a barrier
to buyers making commitments to the use of alternative inputs or sources of supply. This
paper, then, questions the standard prediction of an inverse relationship between market
performance and sunk investments. 46 The paper also raises questions about the market
definition and barriers criteria specified by the Merger Guidelines.
46 See Gilbert (1987) for a discussion of the welfare implications of specific assets in the
framework of the modern theory of market structure.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Proposition 2.
To prove the Proposition first observe that there is no subgame perfect equilibrium
of the sequential game discussed in the text that involves vertical integration. Assume that
period T+M before the last has arrived and the buyer is not vertically integrated. Then, the
only equilibrium involves monopoly price from that period on. It is straightforward to
show that if the seller has not vertically integrated up to period T+M+l before the last, a
price P will arise at that period that will make the buyer prefer not to vertically integrate.
Such a price will arise independently of whether the seller or the buyer is the one to quote
the price. Thus, given that the price for the period T+M+l before the last is P, the buyer
will not vertically integrate if
-76 T + (a-c)6 T— * a-P,
1-6
or,
P£ " * ~ (a-c)?> T - d-o)/o r - a - (a-c)6 r*w > P, (A1 )
where r=T+M, and where the equality uses the definition of T+M given by
(a-c)5 r - 7(1-6)6 r - (a-c)S™ (A2 )
On the other hand, the seller would prefer to sell at a price P below the monopoly
price, if so doing the buyer would not vertical integrate, only if
P-c * (a-c)(l-6™) -$— > (a-c) -^- + yI5 T
,
1-6 1-6
< Al >
or,
P£ - « ~ (a-c)6 T * (Y -5)/5 r - a - (a-c)5™ - (l-y)5 7' < />, M^^
where the equality uses again the definition of T+M.
Thus, for P to be profitable for both the buyer and the seller, it has to satisfy (Al)
and (A3) simultaneously. Since 7<1, there always exists a P such that (Al) and (A3) hold. If
the seller is the one that gives the price offer, then it will offer Pmax as long as the buyer
does not vertically integrate. If, instead, the buyer is the one that gives price offers, it
would offer to pay not to vertically integrate if the price does not exceed P min .
Similarly, it can be shown that if the buyer did not vertical integrate at period
T+M+2 before the last, then there exists a price less than a that will deter the buyer from
vertically integrating at that time. To determine the range of prices that can arise, assume
first that if the buyer does not vertical integrate, then next period's price will be such that
the buyer will remain indifferent between integrating or not (i.e. the boundary in (Al)).
Then prices are given by
P£ - « " (a-c)6™ - a - (a-c)5 r + 7(1-5)5 T. (A4a)
If, instead, the next period's price is expected to be such that the seller will remain
indifferent between charging the monopoly price or a limit price, then PT+2 is given by
?£ - « " (a-c)5 r + Y/5 r(l-5). (A4*>)
Thus, if the limit price is such that the buyer is indifferent between vertically
integrating and not, then P^tx = PmtJ- And > similarly, it can be shown that Pmtx=Pmli< r°r
all t. That is, the limit price is a constant and equals the upper bound in (3c). If, instead,
the limit price is set at the reservation level of the seller, then it can be shown that for k>2,
the limit price is given by
< A2 >
P£ -P^ -c + (a-cXl-6 7) ylb\\-b). (AS)
To show (A5), solve first for P^tn- whil e tedious, it can be shown that Pmtn=Pmtn
using a method similar to the derivation of (A3). Thus, for k=3, (A5) holds. Assume now,
that at T+M+k periods before the last the seller expects the future limit prices to remain
constant until T+M+l periods before the last when the price will be given by the lower
bound in (A3). Thus, the limit price P that leaves the seller indifferent between charging P
for k periods or the monopoly price a for T periods is given by
(a-c)h*l + Y/5 r - (P-c)±^- * b^ipT+^-c) * 5*(a-c)^^,
1-5 1-5 1-5
which after solving for P confirms (A5). Thus, if the bargaining game between the buyer
and the seller is such that the seller is always left indifferent between charging the
monopoly or the limit price, then the limit price is a constant (equal to the lower bound in
(3c)) until T+M+l periods before the last. At T+M+l periods before the last the price falls
to the lower bound of (A3), and from T+M periods before the last to the end the price is the
monopoly price, a.
Therefore, the range of feasible limit prices in the finite horizon model is the same
as in the infinite horizon one, except for the period T+M+l before the last, proving the
proposition.
B. Proof of Proposition 4:
Let us first analyze the case of 7=0. We show first that the upper bound to the limit
price is given by
0< -75 r + («-c)_*L- < JL±t.
n(l-5) n(l-5)'
< A3 >
or
P L i a - (a-c)5 r + «/6 r(l-5). (Bl)
Consider the game that develops between buyers when facing monopoly pricing. If a
buyer expects someone else to vertically integrate its profits from not vertically integrating
are simply
6 r
a-c
n(l-S)
which exceed those if it would vertically integrate. Thus, every buyer prefers someone else
to vertical integrate. This game has N equilibria involving pure strategies, and one
symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium. The pure strategies equilibria consist of any of the
N buyers vertically integrating. The mixed strategy equilibrium is such that all buyers are
indifferent between vertically integrating and not, and where each chooses a probability p
of integration such that the others will be indifferent between vertically integrating and
not. In either type of equilibrium, all buyers prefer not to vertically integrate if the price
charged satisfies (Bl). Observe that the upper bound to the limit price is substantially
above the upper bound given by (3a).
The condition for the seller to prefer to charge P L , rather than a, depends on the
nature of buyers' strategics. If buyers play mixed strategies, then the probability of each
vertically integrating (p) is determined by
-76 T * (a-c)— p(a-c)—- + (l-p)6ni[-/* "~C ],
/i(l-6) n(l
-6) n(l-5)
or
p - 1-
a "c
-s
(B2)
nl
< A4 >
and S prefers to charge P L only if
1-
57*
P L-c , . 1-5+671
fc (a-c)-
1-6 1-6
or
p* t c + (a-o[i--4^-], riw;
1-6 + 5tc
where
is the probability of at least one firm vertically integrating. Thus, in the mixed strategy
equilibrium, P L has to satisfy
c + (a-c)[l *-iL_] i p L < c + (a-cXl-6 7) + (l-6)5 rn/. (B4)
l-5 + 5:t
Since 7r/( 1 -5h-5tt)< 1 , the LHS of (B4) exceeds the lower bound of the limit price for
the single buyer case when 7=0. Thus, since there is a positive probability that no buyers
will vertically integrate, (B4) implies that there many not be an equilibrium with limit
pricing. This result, however, docs not follow if buyers play pure strategies. In this case
the seller will prefer to charge a limit price of PL only if
P L -c , .1-5 7
"
1-6 1-5
< A5 >
which is exactly equation (3b) when 7=0. Thus, P is given by
(1-5 ^a + cb T < P L * a(l-6 7) + c5 T + (1-5)5 r«/ f^j
Comparing (B4) and (B5), observe that the upper bound to the limit price is the same,
and it increases with n. The lower bound in (B4) is above that in (B5) which equals the
lower bound in the single buyer case, showing the proposition when the seller has no
recoverable assets.
When the seller has recoverable assets (7>0) the set of equilibria in the buyers'
subgame is expanded. There are now (!J) pure strategy equilibria, and n symmetric mixed
strategy equilibria. The pure strategy equilibria differ in which two firms vertically
integrating. Since a single firm vertically integrating obtains a monopoly, such a
configuration cannot be an equilibrium to the subgame. But, if two firms are vertically
integrating, no other firm will like to do so. Each of the mixed strategy equilibria now
involves one firm choosing to vertically integrate with probability 1, and the remaining n-1
choosing to vertically integrate with probability given by (B2). Since now the probability
of one firm vertically integrating is one, the calculus for the seller is the same as for the
case of a single buyer. Thus, the lower bound for the limit price is given by (3b). The
upper bound is still given by (Bl) which exceeds (3a). Thus, proving the proposition.
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